Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent said Sunday he will encourage G20 members to reexamine their trade terms with China ahead of a G20 finance leaders meeting in Asheville, North Carolina, set for Aug. 31 and Sept. 1.
Bessent described the current volume of Chinese exports as unsustainable and said the Chinese economy is attempting to export its way out of significant internal weakness. He said China needs to rebalance its economy rather than redirect that weakness onto global trading partners through a trade surplus he put at $1.2 trillion.
He acknowledged that the direct U.S.-China trade position is rapidly improving, which he attributed to the high tariffs the United States has placed on Chinese goods, near-bans on selected categories and specific restrictions on connected-vehicle technology. But he said the broader global picture is unsustainable and requires G20 engagement beyond the bilateral American approach.
The U.S. tariff posture on China
The United States has placed elevated tariffs on a wide range of Chinese goods under Section 301 authority, which remain in place for most China-origin imports. Solar cells face a 50 percent tariff. Advanced chips face a 25 percent tariff. In June, the Trump administration required Polestar, a Chinese electric vehicle manufacturer, to stop selling vehicles in the United States beginning with the 2027 model year, citing the Connected Vehicles Rule, which restricts imports and sales of vehicles with connected-vehicle technology linked to Chinese networks.
These measures have contributed to the improvement Bessent cited in the bilateral trade balance, but they do not address the broader question of what happens to Chinese export volume that cannot enter the American market. That volume redirects to other G20 members, which is the premise behind Bessent’s multilateral approach.
The G20 context
The G20 finance ministers meeting in Asheville is an opportunity for Bessent to build a coalition of trading partners willing to coordinate pressure on China’s export-driven economic model. Whether European nations, Japan, South Korea and others facing similar competitive pressure will align with an American-led initiative is unclear. Bessent’s framing of it as a global rather than bilateral concern is designed to maximize that alignment.
The economic weakness is well documented. The economy grew 4.3 percent in the second quarter of 2026, below Beijing’s target range, with deflation pressures and a property sector decline that has not yet reached a bottom. The government has responded by accelerating investment in advanced technology and high-end manufacturing, which increases rather than reduces export pressure on global trading partners.
What rebalancing would require
Meaningful rebalancing would require domestic consumption to grow as a share of economic activity. That requires households to spend more and save less, which in turn requires wage growth, stronger social safety nets that reduce precautionary saving, and property wealth that is not continuing to decline in value.
None of those conditions currently hold in China. Beijing’s response has been to expand state investment in priority sectors rather than strengthen conditions for household consumption. Without structural domestic demand growth, the export surplus is likely to persist or grow.
